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ABSTRACT
Recent declines in job tenure have coincided with a shift away from traditional defined benefit (DB)
pensions, which reward long tenure. Recent evidence also points to an increase in job-to-job
movements by workers, and we document gains in relative wages of job-to-job movers over a similar
period. We develop a search model in which firms may offer tenure-based contracts like DB
pensions to reduce the incidence of costly on-the-job search by workers. Reduced search costs can,
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Workers in the United States have experienced signi￿cant changes in both job tenure and the
structure of employer-provided pensions over the past twenty years. Traditional de￿ned bene￿t
(DB) pensions, which reward long tenure, have become steadily less common, while both actual
and expected job tenure have fallen over the same period. The link between job tenure and
pension trends has not been closely examined but o⁄ers insights about both phenomena. This
paper investigates how on-the-job (OTJ) search by workers provides a motive for the use of deferred
compensation and how that motive may have changed over time.
Spurred by evidence of a long-term increase in job-to-job mobility (Stewart [41]), we show that
these increased job-to-job ￿ ows have been associated with rising relative wages. We develop a
model in which workers may search for new, more productive matches while on the job. A key
feature of the model is that both OTJ search and the resulting quits are costly to the ￿rm. We
show conditions under which the ￿rm, to avoid this loss, might o⁄er a contract that dissuades
workers from searching. The contract takes the form of delayed compensation that is conditioned
on the worker not quitting. These contracts look much like DB pensions. In a recent paper,
Friedberg and Owyang [13] (hereafter FO) argued that the value of long-term jobs has fallen,
which has reduced expected job tenure and thus undermined the e⁄ectiveness of DB pensions at
deterring moral hazard. This paper pursues a related line of research, incorporating a more realistic
representation of job search and thus highlighting another change in the nature of long-term jobs.
In this framework, an increase in the gains from OTJ search caused by, for example, lower
search costs, results in more search, more quits, and consequently shorter job tenure, all of which
undermines the incentive to o⁄er pensions. Although a decline in search costs has a theoretically
ambiguous e⁄ect on relative wages of job-to-job movers in our model, our evidence that their
relative wages have improved in recent years bolsters the premise that OTJ search has grown more
rewarding. We emphasize an endogenous shift in the use of pensions in this paper, as opposed to
exogenous changes resulting from new government regulations that have been highlighted in the
pension literature. Also, in contrast to FO where the decline in job tenure and DB pension use
results from an increase in endogenous match destruction, we consider the role played by increased
voluntary worker ￿ ows, which are involuntary to the ￿rm.
2This paper draws on research in several areas. The model is motivated by the empirical
importance job-to-job ￿ ows by workers and the role they play in explaining the decline in job
tenure. The paper also builds on an emerging literature that documents a variety of evidence
about reduced search costs. Anecdotal reports suggest that search costs have dropped, most
recently as use of the internet has expanded and over a longer period due to structural shifts in
the economy, some of them associated with thicker local labor markets.1 In the search literature,
a reduction in search frictions is generally predicted to increase the productivity range over which
agents search, thus raising job-to-job ￿ ows (Pissarides [34]) and reducing average job tenure.2 The
greater incentive to search diminishes the e⁄ectiveness of pensions in deterring search ￿thus linking
recent trends in job tenure and pension structure.3
This paper also extends the literature focusing on DB pensions as incentive contracts, building
on work by Lazear [25]. Notably, this paper complements other recent work incorporating tenure-
based contracts that deter OTJ search (Burdett and Coles [5], Stevens [39]). The essential similarity
of those two papers and ours is that a worker in a job may choose not to seek outside o⁄ers if the
￿rm o⁄ers a rich enough incentive, for example by tying compensation to tenure, even though
productivity need not rise with tenure. The papers di⁄er in the details of search and match
formation, which determine the particular costs and bene￿ts of search. Both Stevens and Burdett
and Coles assumed that ￿rms post wages for jobs in which productivity is known in advance and
workers choose among jobs o⁄ering di⁄ering starting points on the tenure-based wage pro￿le. Job
o⁄ers arrive costlessly, but workers are less likely to quit the higher they are on the wage pro￿le.
Firms face a tension between starting workers at a lower point on the wage pro￿le and raising
current pro￿ts, or at a higher point and raising retention rates and future pro￿ts.4 In Stevens,
￿rms post not a wage but a contract taking the form that all pay is deferred until a date T agreed
1For example, local labor markets are changing so that workers with given skills seem to have more ￿rms to match
with in a particular location. This is a consequence of trends like the shift into services and out of manufacturing,
in which ￿rms tend to be local monopsonists; of rising urbanization and resulting agglomeration economies, either
within or across industries [16]; and of reductions in communication and transportation costs, which increase the gain
to decentralizing production (Gersbach and Schmutzler [15]).
2If the matching function exhibits increasing returns to scale (Sato [36] reported evidence of this), then develop-
ments like these will have a magni￿ed e⁄ect in raising matching e¢ ciency and hence the gains to search.
3This emphasis complements recent papers that explore conditions under which reductions in search frictions
undermine long-term relationships (Ramey and Watson [35], McLaren and Newman [27], Matouschek, Ramezzana,
and Robert-Nicoud [26]).
4The starting point on the wage pro￿le is heterogeneous across ￿rms since they di⁄er by size (as they can hire
more than one worker) and by productivity (in Stevens).
3to at the outset. In Burdett and Coles, workers are risk-averse, so ￿rms o⁄er a contract with rising
wages.
In comparison, our model simpli￿es some aspects of job markets in order to expand on others.
Instead of posted contracts for jobs with known productivity, we assume bargaining after risk-
neutral agents meet and get a permanent productivity draw. That draw determines whether the
worker accepts the match and, in addition, a pension contract to forgo OTJ search. In our case,
search is costly, which explains why (as in the real world) only some and not all workers search
OTJ. We also assume that a ￿rm cannot post a vacancy while a worker occupies the job, and that
a ￿rm faces uncertainty in the value of future matches. The resulting costs of search borne by ￿rms
motivate the ￿rms to discourage workers from searching. Compared to the papers by Burdett and
Coles and by Stevens, we o⁄er a more stylized contract. The contract consists of wages determined
by Nash bargaining, together with a lump-sum paid out to the worker in the event that a match
ends exogenously but forfeited if the worker quits.5
Besides incorporating asymmetries in the costs and bene￿ts of search, another key contribution
that we make is the analysis of changes in the economic environment that undermine tenure-based
contracts. While the papers by Burdett and Coles and by Stevens concentrate on proving the
existence of the tenure-based contract in the steady state, we emphasize the fragility of the contract
in response to plausible changes in the economic environment. Our hypothesis of an endogenous
motive for the shift in pension structure also contrasts with the pension literature that focuses on
exogenous changes in federal regulations. The shift in emphasis here suggests the possibility that
regulatory changes responded to an underlying increase in the gains to worker mobility.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss trends in private pension coverage,
job tenure, job-to-job ￿ ows, and job search costs. We also present evidence that wages of people
moving job-to-job rose over time, relative to wages of both people staying in the same job and
people starting a new job after a spell of unemployment. In Section 3, we present the baseline
model with OTJ search. In Section 4, we introduce the pension contract which may prevent OTJ
search. In Section 5, we show how a reduction in the cost of OTJ search may reduce the value of
a job and hence render the pension contract. Section 6 concludes.
5We prove that such a contract are feasible, while the other papers proved that the contracts are optimal.
42 Background on Worker Mobility and Pensions
In this section, we discuss trends in job tenure and private pensions. We then present evidence
developed by others about the incidence of on-the-job search and job-to-job ￿ ows, which are im-
portant in magnitude, and about trends in search, job-to-job ￿ ows. Lastly, we present data that
we have constructed analyzing wage changes associated with job-to-job ￿ ows.
2.1 Trends in job tenure
Over the last 20 years, both actual and expected job tenure have fallen. Expected tenure data are
noisier than actual tenure data but show a greater decline. Average current tenure of male full-time
employees in the Survey of Consumer Finances fell from 9.7 in 1983 to 8.8 years in 1998, while
expected remaining tenure fell from 18.6 in 1983 and 16.2 in 1989 to 14.7 in 1998.6 Changes in job
tenure among women re￿ ect a combination of cohort-speci￿c increases in labor force attachment and
secular declines in job tenure. Average current tenure of female full-time employees rose from 7.4
years in 1983 to 8.1 years in 1992 and then fell back to 7.3 in 1998, while expected remaining tenure
fell from 15.9 in 1983 to 12.5 in 1989, rose to 14.4 in 1992, and then fell to 12.8 in 1998.7 Adding
together current and expected remaining tenure yields subjective estimates of total expected job
duration. For men, total expected tenure fell from 27.3 years in 1983 to 24.6 years in 1989 and
23.0 years in 1998, a 15.5% decline between 1983 and 1998 and a 6.3% decline between 1989 and
1998. For women, expected tenure fell by 12.9% between 1983 and 1998 and by 10.3% between
1992 and 1998.
A decline in expected remaining job tenure may indicate either a greater willingness to change
jobs or a greater fear of involuntary job loss. We do not have evidence about whether the rate of
voluntary quits has risen. However, Farber [11] noted that the decline in job tenure in the CPS
was not matched by an increase in layo⁄s, indicating that increases in mobility are to some extent
voluntary. In any case, a perceived increase in the risk of involuntary job loss should induce more
6See FO for more details. Since the mid-1990s, researchers have found mounting evidence of a decline in male
job tenure in the Current Population Survey (Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen [31]; Bureau of Labor Statistics [6]),
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (Jaeger and Stevens [20]), and the National Longitudinal Surveys (Bernhardt,
et. al., [3]), although not the Survey of Income and Program Participation (Gottschalk and Mo¢ tt [17]). Other
researchers have not investigated data on expected tenure.
7The wording and organization of questions regarding future work plans was di⁄erent enough that the 1983 SCF
may not be comparable to later years.
5on-the-job search as well.
2.2 The structure of private pensions
At any given time, over half of all full-time workers in the U.S. have pension coverage in their
current job, and a greater number have been in a job with a pension at some point.8 Fundamental
di⁄erences in the structure of pension plans a⁄ect the incentive to stay in a particular job. DB
plans discourage mobility for many years after a worker starts a job, while DC plans are largely
tenure-neutral. The path of pension wealth accrual in a typical DB plan is characterized by sharp
spikes, as in Figure 1.9 Allen, Clark, and McDermed [2] estimated that the pension loss associated
with switching jobs for the average worker with a DB plan aged 35-54 was approximately half a
year￿ s earnings. The smooth path of DC pension wealth accruals, which consist of contributions
to an account and accumulated returns, as shown in Figure 1, stands in stark contrast.
Workers have experienced a major shift in pension coverage in the last twenty years. Among
full-time employees with a pension in the SCF, 69% had a DB plan and 45% had a DC plan in
1983, while 40% had a DB plan and 80% had a DC plan in 1998 (some have both types). FO
demonstrated that workers with DB pensions have longer current and expected total job tenure than
workers with DC pensions or no pensions, and that the same workers are generally experiencing
declines in tenure and in DB pension coverage.
In a series of papers summarized in [25], Lazear developed models in which employers structure
compensation to deter shirking by workers whose e⁄ort cannot be observed perfectly. A DB
pension, whose value rises with job tenure, motivates e⁄ort by workers who do not want to get ￿red
and lose their ￿bond.￿ Early models of pensions, however, did not typically incorporate uncertainty
about job duration, nor make explicit the nature of the worker￿ s outside option. FO incorporated
moral hazard in a matching model which clari￿es the value of tenure-based contracts, while this
paper allows workers in jobs to seek new opportunities as well, which provides another motive for
pension contracts.
8The rate of pension coverage in the current job among full-time employees declined a little from 67% in the 1983
SCF to 58% in 1998.
9Pension wealth in year t is the actuarially discounted real present value of expected pension bene￿ts if the job
ends at year t. Pension wealth accrual is the discounted change in pension wealth if the worker stays another year and
then leaves. Figure 1 shows pension wealth accrual in two plans from the Health and Retirement Study (Friedberg
and Webb [14]).
6Recent research on private pensions has focused on changes in federal pension regulations.
Regulatory changes have enhanced DB funding provisions and DC tax incentives and placed limits
on the structure of DB and DC plans. FO discussed a variety of reasons why regulatory changes
do not appear to fully explain the shift in pension structure. For example, pension structure has
not changed uniformly in all jobs; instead, workers have moved over time from jobs that typically
o⁄er DB plans to jobs that typically o⁄er DC plans (Clark and MacDermed [7], Gustman and
Steinmeier [18], Kruse [23], Ippolito [19], Papke [32]). Also, inequality in pension coverage by skill
group has increased, mirroring trends in earnings inequality that have been attributed to structural
changes in the economy (Bloom and Freeman [4], Even and Macpherson [9]).
2.3 Existing research on worker mobility
Data limitations severely hamper the measurement of job-to-job ￿ ows, on-the-job search, and search
costs. Nevertheless, U.S. data that has become available since the mid-1990s o⁄er several pieces
of relevant evidence. First, job-to-job moves are relatively frequent. Second, on-the-job search is
common. Third, search costs appear to be declining, as, for example, internet use has expanded.
2.3.1 Job-to-job ￿ ows
In 1994, the Current Population Survey (CPS) started to ask people whether they were still working
for the same employer as they had been a month earlier, which provided a much more accurate view
of job-to-job ￿ ows than was available before. Fallick and Fleischman [10] computed employment-to-
employment ￿ ows in the 1994-2003 CPS. They found that an average of 2.6% of employed workers
changed employers each month, accounting for almost 40% of both job separations and new job
starts ￿a major share of all labor market ￿ ows.10 It remains di¢ cult at this point to distinguish
between cyclical characteristics and secular trends in the data, however. The magnitude of job-to-
job ￿ ows dipped from 1994 to 1996 and rose slowly from 1996 to 2000, then fell considerably from
2000 to 2003 during a time of labor market weakness.
Stewart [41],[42] recently developed a much longer series, though with a smaller sample size,
10It should be kept in mind that this method will underestimate job-to-job ￿ ows. The CPS follows residents of
the same address from month to month, rather than following the same individuals, so it misses job changes that
involve a change of residence.
7based on retrospective data from March CPSs.11 Stewart [41] documented a substantial increase in
job-to-job ￿ ows (de￿ned as occurring with two or fewer weeks of unemployment) from 1975 to 2000
of 59%. This was matched by a decline in job-to-unemployment ￿ ows, suggesting that workers are
increasingly better at searching while on-the-job. While the series rose and then fell during the
1970s to roughly the same level in 1982, it then increased steadily afterwards, save for a dip during
the economic downturn of 1989 to 1991.
2.3.2 On-the-job search
In February 1995, 1997, and 1999, the CPS asked questions designed to elicit information about on-
the-job search by workers. Meisenheimer and Ilg [28] tabulated data on active search by employed
wage-and-salary workers.12 They found that, in February 1999, 4.5% had actively looked for a new
job within the previous three months.13 Fallick and Fleischman [10] linked information on search
in February 1997 and 1999 with job-to-job ￿ ows a month later and concluded that those who had
actively searched for a job in the three months prior to February were much more likely to have
changed jobs (11.3% versus 2.1% for non-searchers) by March. Thus, on-the-job search is followed
by job changes.
Nevertheless, it appears that traditional survey methods do not capture all forms of job search.
Only about 1/5 of those who had moved from one job to another in March had actively looked for
a job earlier, according to Fallick and Fleischman. A similarly low rate (about 1/3) of those who
had started a new job in March after being out of work in February were classi￿ed in February as
unemployed, i.e. actively searching for a job. There may be a few explanations for the apparent
low rate of active job search among those subsequently starting new jobs: contacts initiated by
potential employers may not be reported as active search; active search may have only taken place
a few weeks immediately prior to starting a new job; and some new jobs resulting from active job
search are associated with residential moves and thus not followed in the CPS.
11Fallick and Fleischman discussed the drawbacks of other attempts to use the CPS to develop longer series of
worker ￿ ows. Kamborouv and Manovskii [21] noted the di¢ culty of identifying occupational mobility using Stewart￿ s
method, arising because of high rates of error in occupational coding. We are not directly concerned with occupational
mobility, though.
12Active job search involves contacting an employer, employment agency, school employment center, or acquain-
tances about a job; sending out resumes; ￿lling out applications; checking union or professional registers; or placing
or answering ads. Passive job search involves reading the want-ads or attending a job training program.
13The incidence of on-the-job search declined between 1995, when it was 5.6%, and 1999. It is, again, impossible
to distinguish between cyclical and secular shifts in behavior with a short series.
82.3.3 Search costs and the internet
While we have no data on long-term trends in search costs, many researchers have focused on the
reduced cost of conveying information brought about by the expansion of the internet since the
early 1990s. The incidence of internet search is high. In the December 1998 CPS, Kuhn and
Skuterud [24] found that 7.1% of people with jobs, 15.9% of people with jobs and with internet
access at home, and half of the unemployed with internet access at home used the internet for job
search. The rate of internet search by those with jobs exceeds earlier estimates of on-the-job search
using all other methods, as we noted above (Meisenheimer and Ilg [28]).
Moreover, there is growing evidence of an impact on labor markets. It is many times cheaper
for ￿rms to post vacancy announcements on the internet than in newspapers (Autor [1]), and
almost all major employers now accept online job applications (Freeman [12]). These changes
may have subtler e⁄ects too; heterogeneity in the way jobseekers use the internet may explain
simultaneous claims that individuals who use the internet are positively selected on unobservable
qualities (according to internet search ￿rms cited in Kuhn and Skuterud [24]) or negatively selected
(a belief commonly held by employers, according to Autor). Meanwhile, Autor suggested that
employers are increasingly using the internet to target employed ￿passive candidates￿ ; activity of
this type would help explain the increase in job-to-job ￿ ows together with the relatively low rate
of job search reported by job movers.
Two recent papers attempted to estimate the causal e⁄ect of internet search on labor market
outcomes, but they were limited by the scope of the available data as well as the identi￿cation
strategies. Kuhn and Skuterud [24] focused on the unemployed. They found that, after controlling
for observable di⁄erences correlated with both internet use and shorter unemployment durations
(like education and previous occupation), the unemployed who used the internet for job search were
neither more nor less likely to be employed a year later than other unemployed. Estimates that
attempted to control for unobservable di⁄erences suggested that those who used the internet may
have been less likely to be employed a year later.
Stevenson [40] documented some of the consequences of internet job search using an instrumental
variable strategy. She focused on average internet penetration rates across U.S. states and found,
after instrumenting, several positive and statistically signi￿cant relationships. In states with
9higher internet penetration, the unemployed used a greater number of types of search activities;
employment-to-employment ￿ ows among more skilled workers rose; and interstate mobility rates of
younger and more skilled individuals rose ￿all evidence that the internet facilitates job search. As
Stevenson remarked, this is clearly an area that awaits further investigation in order to understand
how to match theoretical concepts of job search with those that can be observed and measured.
2.4 New evidence on wages and job-to-job ￿ ows
Earlier, we discussed the new method developed by Stewart [41] that allows for a long-term investi-
gation of job-to-job ￿ ows. We have extended his method to study wages associated with job-to-job
￿ ows from 1983-2001. While we cannot examine wage changes directly, we can compare hourly
wages in a given March CPS for two groups of workers who have been continuously employed for
the last 14.5 months ￿those who experienced a job-to-job ￿ ow relative to those who stayed in the
same job continuously.14 We make this comparison by running a regression in each year￿ s sam-
ple, putting log hourly earnings on the left-hand side and an indicator variable on the right-hand
side for people experiencing a job-to-job ￿ ow within the last year, along with controls for gender,
education, age, and race.15
Our results are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The hourly wage of people in the CPS who experienced
a job-to-job ￿ ow is lower throughout than the hourly wage of people staying in the same job
continuously. However, Figure 2 shows a major, steady, and statistically signi￿cant decline in this
relative wage gap in the 1990s, with the gap closing from -17.6% in 1992 at the end of a recession
to -3.0% in 2001. Because job-to-job ￿ ows are cyclical, we went further by regressing this relative
wage gap for job changers on the contemporaneous unemployment rate, with the resulting residual
shown in the heavy lower line in Figure 3. Except when this cyclically-adjusted relative wage gap
experienced a dip during the 1990 recession, it otherwise shrank steadily during both the 1980s
(from -15.7% in 1983 to -11.6% in 1990) and the 1990s (from -13.6% in 1993 to -10.4% in 2001),
14We focus on almost the same sample as Stewart, as described in the Figure 2 notes. We limit our focus to the
CPS outgoing rotation groups, who reported data on current hourly earnings. Our resulting sample is roughly 1/4
of the total available and ranges from 7,000-9,000 per year. While we could try computing wage changes by getting
hourly earnings data for the same people a year earlier, this would involve matching across CPSs and incurring
substantial attrition that is probably correlated with job changes.
15These demographic controls account for changes in wages due to changes in the composition of the labor force.
The results were virtually the same when we allowed the coe¢ cients on the demographics to change from year to
year; we report results when the covariates are held constant over the sample period. The coe¢ cient on the relative
wage of job-to-job movers is statistically signi￿cant every year, based on Huber-White standard errors.
10declining by one-third overall.
The CPS cannot be used to make a further comparison with people who changed jobs but
experienced an intervening spell of unemployment. Instead, we identify those who were in a job
in March and experienced any unemployment spell within the previous 14.5 months.16 Then,
we compare current wages for those experiencing a job-to-job ￿ ow with those experiencing some
kind of unemployment-to-job ￿ ow (without knowing whether the period began with a job or not).
We ￿nd that the job-to-job movers experienced relative wage gains on this front as well. The
lighter line near the top of Figure 3 shows the di⁄erence between residual wages, after controlling
for demographics and then business cycle e⁄ects as above, of unemployment-to-job movers and of
job-to-job movers. The relative wage gap for the unemployment-to-job movers rose from -4.2% in
1983 to -7.7% in 2001, relative to the job-to-job movers.
To sum up, we ￿nd that job-to-job movers experienced relative wage gains over the same period
in which job-to-job ￿ ows rose and DB pension use declined. The wage gap among those who moved
job-to-job within the previous 14.5 months narrowed signi￿cantly and substantially, compared to
those staying in a job continuously. Moreover, the wage gap compared to those in a job but with
an unemployment spell in the previous 14.5 months widened signi￿cantly.
3 The Model
Spurred by evidence of a long-term increase in job-to-job ￿ ows and of gains in relative wages of job-
to-job movers, we develop a model in which workers may search for new, more productive matches
while on the job. The framework we employ here is based on stochastic job matching models with
incomplete contracting.17 Our contribution is to incorporate ￿ ows to new jobs out of employment
as well as unemployment.
Deterring OTJ search o⁄ers a motive to defer compensation when ￿rms cannot directly con-
tract to prevent quits, although the willingness of agents to commit to long-term contracts depends
crucially on the degree of uncertainty ￿hence the importance of assuming stochastic match draws.
16The problem is that we cannot distinguish those who began the period in a job, became unemployed, and then
got a new job versus those who were unemployed at the outset and then got a job. These two groups are probably
somewhat heterogeneous.
17The stochastic job matching framework builds on den Haan, Ramey, and Watson [8]. Few other models combine
OTJ search and match-speci￿c productivity. Our model of OTJ search is based on Mortensen [29] and Pissarides
[33] and [34].
11Because we are speci￿cally interested in this compensation, we will focus almost exclusively on cur-
rently employed workers (rather than the unemployed) as we discuss the model. After developing
the model, we show how an increase in the expected gains from OTJ search undermine the pension
contracts.
3.1 Basic framework
The matching market. A unit mass of risk-neutral workers and a continuum of ￿rms search in
the labor market during a given period and match with probability ￿.18 Workers searching in the
labor market may be either employed (E) or unemployed (U). Workers searching while employed
incur a search cost c(Y ), which is manifested as a reduction in output and increases with match
productivity. Firms, however, cannot search for a worker unless the position is vacant. This
assumption prevents the ￿rm from ￿ring a worker if it were to ￿nd a more productive one. A
newly matched worker and ￿rm receive a productivity draw Y , which is drawn from a cumulative
distribution function F(y) that is homogeneous for all new matches. They either commence pro-
duction if the productivity draw exceeds a reservation value or re-enter the market to seek a new
match next period.
Separation and Search. Unlike some related models (see FO), we assume that a match￿ s
productivity stays ￿xed after it is initially drawn. We impose the alternative simplifying assumption
of exogenous layo⁄s in order to preserve our focus on quits. Thus, matches end because of one of
the following:
￿ (Involuntary) Layo⁄. At the beginning of the period, an exogenous shock arrives with prob-
ability ￿, independent of current match-speci￿c productivity. Layo⁄ shocks are idiosyncratic
and generate the worker ￿ ow to unemployment.
￿ (Voluntary) Quit. If a worker searches OTJ and matches with a new ￿rm, the pair draws
a new level of productivity Y 0. If the new draw exceeds the worker￿ s reservation productiv-
ity, the new match is established and the old one destroyed. Otherwise, the old match is
preserved, and the worker and old ￿rm continue to produce Y , less the cost of search c(Y ) > 0.
18For simplicity, we assume that the match probability is ￿xed, instead of allowing it to vary with the vacancy and
unemployment rate. Thus, we ignore potential decreasing (increasing) returns to scale in the matching function,
which would mitigate (magnify) the e⁄ects of an exogenous increase in the gains from search.
12If a layo⁄ occurs, the worker returns to unemployment and receives the outside option bw
representing unemployment bene￿ts, home production, or leisure, while the ￿rm receives the outside
option bf and opens a vacancy. In the event of a quit, the worker goes to the new job and the
￿rm again receives bf outside option and opens a vacancy. This leads to an asymmetry when the
worker ￿nds a better match: the ￿rm is indi⁄erent as to the cause of separation but the worker is
better o⁄ with a quit than a layo⁄.19
Division of Output. Workers and ￿rms bargain over the surplus of the match which is net
of search costs, with shares determined by bargaining weights. Thus, the worker receives a share
of current productivity ￿(Y ) < Y if there is no search or ￿(Y ￿ c(Y )) < Y ￿ c(Y ) if the worker
searches OTJ. This leads to an additional asymmetry ￿the ￿rm bears part of the costs of search
but enjoys none of its bene￿ts.20
Output is allocated via the function ￿(Y ), determined by Nash bargaining.21 The Nash bar-
gaining solution maximizes the weighted product of the worker￿ s and ￿rm￿ s net surplus from the
job match, where a higher value of ￿, the worker￿ s bargaining weight, raises ￿(Y ). Thus, the value
of the match for each agent is determined by the split of current productivity ￿(Y ).22 The total
value of the match depends on both current output and the expected discounted stream of future
production.
3.2 The value of jobs
The productivity distribution can be divided into three regions. For a productivity draw Y above
a threshold Y > R, an unemployed worker will accept the job. If the draw exceeds some higher
threshold Y > R > R, the worker will not search after accepting the job. In the intermediate
range R > Y > R, the worker will search after accepting the job and accepts any new o⁄er with a
draw exceeding her reservation productivity, determined as follows.
19We assume that the ￿rm cannot write a contract conditioned on the worker not searching.
20Search is thus viewed as a substitute for e⁄ort at work. While the resulting moral hazard adds to the asymmetry
in the costs and bene￿ts of OTJ search, this assumption does not change the qualitative results. In principle, we
could impose some intermediate assumption about leisure-time search.
21We assume that the worker￿ s surplus is the di⁄erence between the value of the new match and unemployment
regardless of the worker￿ s current employment status. Shimer [37] analyzed how Nash bargaining di⁄ers when current
productivity is the threat point. In that case, the worker￿ s share of output depends on her past productivities. For
tractability, we abstract from the possibility here.
22From Pissarides [34], we know that the Nash bargaining allocative mechanism ￿(:) is continuous and di⁄erentiable
and that ￿
0(:) ￿ 0.
13If a worker￿ s current productivity exceeds the search-deterring threshold R, the cost of search
outweighs the expected gain from potentially ￿nding a more suitable match. This is because the
cost of search is increasing in Y while the likelihood of ￿nding an acceptable alternative is shrinking
in Y . We compute the worker￿ s value of a job in this case as
V w
ns(Y ) = ￿(Y ) + ￿ [￿Uw + (1 ￿ ￿)(V w
ns(Y ))]; (1)
where Uw is the value of unemployment. In this case, the worker only separates from the ￿rm if
there is a layo⁄, while in this case there are no search costs to be paid. Similarly, the value to the
￿rm is:
V f
ns(Y ) = Y ￿ ￿(Y ) + ￿
h




where Uf is the value to the ￿rm of holding a vacancy.
If, on the other hand, the productivity draw is not su¢ ciently high to deter search, the worker￿ s
valuation of the match is
V w
s (Y ) = ￿ (Y ￿ c(Y )) + ￿(￿Uw + (1 ￿ ￿)Jw
s (Y )); (3)
where the worker￿ s expected value of matching with a new ￿rm is
Jw
s (Y ) = (1 ￿ ￿)V w
s (Y ) + ￿
"
V w











The value of employment with search is, therefore, the worker￿ s share of current output
less search costs plus the worker￿ s discounted expected future income.
When the worker searches, the value of the job to the ￿rm is de￿ned as follows:
V f
s (Y ) = Y ￿ c(Y ) ￿ ￿ (Y ￿ c(Y )) + ￿
￿






s (Y ) = (1 ￿ ￿)V f
s (Y ) + ￿
h
V f
s (Y )F(R(Y )) + Uf(1 ￿ F(R(Y )))
i
:
14Now, the nature of the asymmetry between worker and ￿rm becomes apparent. Both
share the surplus of the current job, but the worker (who can search OTJ) has access to better
opportunities than the ￿rm, since the ￿rm loses a productive match in case of a quit and cannot
post a vacancy before the quit. Therefore, the value of the job to the worker versus the ￿rm
diverges when the worker searches, compared to the value when the worker does not search. It
is because of this asymmetry that the ￿rm might o⁄er a pension contract. If the ￿rm can o⁄er a
contract which will prevent the worker from searching by, in e⁄ect, lowering the search-deterring
threshold, then the ￿rm will neither share the costs of search nor face the loss resulting from a quit.
3.3 The value of search
We next focus on determining the conditions under which workers search OTJ. A worker with a job
yielding Y will accept any new job with productivity draw Y 0 such that its value V w(Y 0) > V w
s (Y ),
where the lack of the subscript on the left-hand side explicitly assumes the possibility of matching
to a search-deterring job. However, as we demonstrate shortly, any search-deterring job necessarily
yields a higher valuation, so the job-to-job acceptance threshold is determined by a new job o⁄er
that would entail continued search. The acceptance condition can be summarized in the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 Acceptance Threshold￿ Job to Job. Given (3), a worker currently in a match yielding
productivity Y < R and therefore searching on-the-job will accept any new match with productivity
Y 0 > Y .23
Since new matches are only formed with vacant jobs, Nash-bargaining of wages implies that the
￿rm will hire any worker who would accept the job.
Although better o⁄ers are possible, above productivity R a worker does not search because the
expected gain is outweighed by the search cost. R is the value such that the worker￿ s expected
return from searching just equals the cost of search. Consider a worker in a match currently
yielding Y . The worker￿ s gain from search GS(Y ) is
GS(Y ) = V w
s (Y ) ￿ V w
ns(Y ) = ￿ (Y ￿ c(Y )) ￿ ￿ (Y ) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(V w
ns(Y ) ￿ Jw
s (Y )) (5)
23For tractability, we abstract away from conditions like an endogenous matching rate or endogenous job destruction
as in FO. Such conditions would generate a wedge between the current productivity and the acceptance threshold.
15The gain from search GS(Y ) decreases in Y , since higher Y makes the current match increasingly
attractive relative to other possible matches. At the search-deterring threshold, the worker is
indi⁄erent between searching and receiving V w
s (R) or not searching and receiving V w
ns(R) ￿that is,
GS(R) = 0: We summarize this condition in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Search-Deterring Threshold. A worker is indi⁄erent between searching and not





















The left-hand side of the expression shows the gain in current output from not incurring search
costs, while the right-hand side shows the expected gain from seeking a better match. A con-
sequence of the preceding lemmas is that the support of the productivity distribution over which
the worker engages in OTJ search is not state- or time-dependent, but rather is uniform across all
worker-history combinations, so the thresholds do not depend on the idiosyncratic match-speci￿c
productivity, work history, etc. This will allow us to compute a pension contract that depends only
on the current productivity level. The worker￿ s gain from search (5) reveals the worker￿ s incentives
at varying levels of productivity and will play an important role in determining the existence of the
pension contract that we outline next.
4 The Pension Contract
A ￿rm matched to a worker with current productivity Y < R who is searching OTJ experiences
losses from three sources. Search itself costs the match c(Y ); output is lost when the ￿rm stands
idle immediately after the worker departs; and the match with known productivity is replaced by an
uncertain future draw. Consequently, the ￿rm is willing to compensate the worker for not searching
as long as the compensation does not exceed the gain to the ￿rm from deterring search. Similarly,
the worker is willing to accept the compensation as long as it exceeds the value of opportunities lost
from not searching. We demonstrate that the contract may fail to deter search in some matches,
but it will deter search in relatively more productive matches in the range Y < R, since the surplus
is high enough to make it worth forgoing search.
16Speci￿cally, we consider contracts that, like DB pensions, defer a portion of output destined for
the worker, with the payment forfeited if the worker quits. This payment is made in addition to
the wages that continue to be determined by Nash bargaining. Since we do not model retirement,
we assume that workers get the payment in a lump-sum when the layo⁄ shock inevitably hits.24
Once we abstract away from the risk that the worker loses the pension because the match ends
unexpectedly early, then we can simply characterize the total value of the contract without saying
more about its structure ￿how much is deferred for how long.25
4.1 Will the ￿rm o⁄er the pension contract?
A ￿rm may o⁄er a pension ￿a lump-sum payment at the end of the match that is forfeited if
the worker quits ￿for the purpose of preventing OTJ search.26 The size of the pension a ￿rm
is willing to o⁄er depends on the gain if the worker does not search. The maximum pension
MP(Y ) which the ￿rm in a match with output draw Y will o⁄er at the outset of the match is the
di⁄erence between the value to the ￿rm of the same production level with and without search, so
MP(Y ) = V
f
ns(Y ) ￿ V
f
s (Y ).27 Substituting (4) and (2), we have:
MP(Y ) = ￿(Y ￿ c(Y )) + c(Y ) ￿ ￿(Y ) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[V f
ns(Y ) ￿ Jf
s (Y )]; (6)
where the ￿rst set of terms re￿ ects the gain from avoiding search costs and the second set re￿ ects
the gain from avoiding a vacancy. Equation (6) represents one step toward demonstrating that
24Figure 1 showed that DB pension accruals in the real world eventually turn negative after 20-30 years, encouraging
retirement. Since we do not include a retirement motive here, we ignore this aspect of DB pensions. FO argued
on several grounds that it is unlikely that an exogenous increase in optimal retirement ages caused the decline in DB
pension use.
25FO and Stevens [39] elaborated on the tension that arises in a risky environment between the promised pension
bene￿t and the pension￿ s termination date. If we extended our model so that the pension were forfeited by any early
end to the match, even involuntary, it would not change the qualitative predictions of the model but would further
narrow the productivity range de￿ning a feasible contract (since relatively unproductive matches would not ￿nance
a large enough deferred payment to get the worker to accept the early termination risk). In Burdett and Coles [5],
risk-averse workers prefer upfront pay in order to smooth consumption, which in our model would again narrow the
productivity range over which pensions are feasible. Lastly, we ignore the possibility that the ￿rm breaches the
pension contract. DB pensions are partially insured, and in addition, there is little empirical evidence of obvious
breach by employers .
26Our pension is also similar in ￿ avor to the e¢ ciency wage of Shimer [38], which transfers a portion of output
from the ￿rm to the worker to prevent search.
27Once the ￿rm promises a pension P(Y ) at the outset, it no longer has to set aside any additional funds because
the problem is stationary and the initial amount P(Y ) will continue to deter search. The ex post gain to the ￿rm
from deterring search will almost certainly di⁄er from P(Y ), depending on when the layo⁄ shock ￿ occurs. We may
assume that an insurance market eliminates the risk of early or late termination.
17the pension contract is feasible. The following proposition lays out the next step:
Proposition 3 A Firm￿ s Gain from Deterring OTJ Search. For all productivity levels in
the range R > Y > R, MP(Y ) > 0:
The proposition shows that the ￿rm always bene￿ts from deterring OTJ search. This occurs
because the ￿rm bears some of the costs of search but receives none of the bene￿ts. Moreover,
the maximum value of the pension MP(Y ) rises monotonically with Y , since higher productivity
matches have increasing value over a new match and since search costs rise with Y .28
4.2 Will the worker accept the pension contract?
While (6) reveals the ￿rm￿ s willingness to sacri￿ce some of its surplus to deter the worker from
searching, the ￿rm need o⁄er no more than the worker￿ s gain from OTJ search GS(Y ), as determined
in (5). The resulting pension is incentive-compatible if the maximum value MP(Y ) that the ￿rm
is willing to o⁄er exceeds GS(Y ) and, thus, prevents the worker from searching. Therefore, the





0 if GS(Y ) > MP(Y )
GS(Y ) if GS(Y ) ￿ MP(Y )
. (7)
If the maximum pension MP(Y ) is smaller than GS(Y ), then any pension the ￿rm is willing to
o⁄er will not be incentive-compatible, since it fails to discourage search. A pension is e⁄ective,
therefore, if total expected losses from search exceed expected gains ￿thus fully internalizing the
costs and bene￿ts of search that accrue to agents in the match. Essentially, through the pension,
the ￿rm voluntarily reallocates a portion of its share of output in order to avoid productivity losses
caused by search and periods of idleness caused by quits resulting from search.
Proposition 4 Existence. Suppose the partition of the productivity distribution￿ s support over
which workers search on-the-job is non-degenerate ￿that is, R > R. Then, there exists some Y
28Our results di⁄er from Pissarides [34], who found that search by workers makes ￿rms better o⁄. First, in our
model workers and ￿rms share search costs. Second, ￿rms in our model do not know what match-speci￿c productivity
they will draw next, whereas Pissarides assumed that ￿rms always match at the highest level of productivity. Finally,
￿rms in Pissarides￿model open vacancies until their value is equal to zero, whereas in our model a continuum of ￿rms
exist and have vacancies only when they are not producing.
18such that R > Y > R and ￿(Y ) = MP(Y ) ￿ GS(Y ) > 0. Moreover, ￿(Y ) > 0 implies that there
exists some P(Y ) > 0.
This proposition shows, and Figure 4 illustrates, that over at least some portion of the relevant
region R > Y > R of the productivity distribution, the pension is indeed e⁄ective. As shown in
Figure 4, GS(Y ) falls with Y and de￿nes R at the point where GS(Y ) = 0, while MP(Y ) is positive
and rises with Y . The pension will consequently be e⁄ective at Y = R ￿ ￿, since GS(R) = 0 and
MP(R) > 0.
However, as Figure 4 demonstrates, it is possible that in some matches OTJ search cannot be
discouraged by pensions. While ￿rms want to eliminate search at all productivity levels (since
MP(Y ) > 0), there may be some values of Y such that the worker￿ s incentives cannot be changed
for less than the ￿rm will sacri￿ce. If pensions are infeasible in some matches, it would be in the
lowest productivity matches with OTJ search, i.e. over some range of Y beginning at Y = R. This
occurs in Figure 4, since GS(Y ) and MP(Y ) intersect at a value of Y > R. We denote this value
as RP, de￿ned as the reservation productivity level which, if it lies between R and R, renders the
pension contract infeasible for matches with Y < RP. It is likely that the threshold RP is relevant
in the real world, since we observe that DB pensions are much less common in low-wage jobs.
To sum up, pension contracts exist in medium-productivity jobs (matches with R > Y > RP ￿
R) and not in the highest-productivity search-deterring jobs (with Y > R).29 Moreover, as Figure
4 shows, the pension bene￿t might not be e⁄ective in the lowest productivity jobs (near R). We
cannot further characterize the level of RP 2 (R;R) at which the ￿rm would be just indi⁄erent
between o⁄ering a pension that deters search or not without assuming a particular distribution of
productivity.
While these pension contracts enhance the value of the current job, they may raise or lower
aggregate welfare. On the one hand, pension contracts reduce excessive OTJ search arising from
the asymmetry in how its costs and bene￿ts are distributed. On the other hand, though, new
matches that dominate current ones are not formed. Welfare considerations depend on speci￿c
29In the real world, many very high-wage workers have pensions. Some likely explanations are that high-wage
workers have higher marginal tax rates and higher saving rates; these motivations are not contract-theoretic and lie
beyond the scope of this paper.
19assumptions about the productivity distribution.30
5 A Decline in Search Costs
The feasibility and value of the pension contract shift if the value of the match to the worker or the
￿rm changes. In this section, we analyze how a decline in search costs alters the value of the current
job relative to alternatives. This discussion ties into important trends that we discussed earlier
￿notably, the increased incidence of job-to-job ￿ ows and the increase in relative wages associated
with such ￿ ows, and indirect evidence of declining search costs and more frequent OTJ search.
We will consider the e⁄ect of a simple reduction in search costs in order to capture these changes.
Suppose that search costs uniformly decrease from c0(Y ) to c1(Y ) ￿ c0(Y ) 8Y . This alters the
worker￿ s gains from search GS(Y ) and the ￿rm￿ s maximum pension o⁄er MP(Y ), and in turn the
value of the pension P(Y ) and possibly the threshold of productivity RP at which the pension
is rendered incentive-incompatible. To summarize the consequences for the match, we o⁄er the
following proposition:
Proposition 5 Decrease in Search Costs. Given a productivity distribution F(y) and the ￿xed
allocative mechanism ￿(y), a decrease in search costs causes (i) an increase in the search-preventing
threshold R, (ii) an increase in the worker￿ s gains from search GS(Y ), and (iii) a decrease in the
￿rm￿ s gains from preventing search MP(Y ).
These e⁄ects are illustrated in Figure 5 and arise because both ￿ (Y ￿ c1(Y )) > ￿ (Y ￿ c0(Y ))
and Y ￿c1(Y ) > Y ￿c0(Y ).31 Because the worker gets to keep more of current output in the event
of search, it boosts the gains from search GS(Y ), de￿ned in (5). That in turn raises the search
threshold from R0 computed from search costs c0(Y ) to R1 computed from search costs c1(Y ).
Therefore, in the absence of pension contracts, some workers previously satis￿ed with Y will begin
to search.
These changes will clearly in￿ uence the viability and size of the pension contract. The increase
in GS(Y ) makes it more costly for ￿rms to discourage search. Also, because the ￿rm gets to keep
30In a very di⁄erent model than ours, NagypÆl [30] investigated the aggregate welfare consequences of employment
protection policies that raise the cost of dismissal when there is learning in matches. She studied ine¢ ciencies
generated by the use of legal employment protection to prevent layo⁄s, while we study pensions that prevent quits.
31Note that there may be enough workers with R1 > Y > R0 such that total output net of search costs decreases
rather than increases.
20more of current output in the event of search, it reduces the gain from preventing search and hence
the maximum pension MP(Y ) the ￿rm is willing to o⁄er, as de￿ned in (6).
We argue that under realistic parameters the pension-feasible region will probably shrink as a
result, and hence the total number of pensions o⁄ered in the economy will decrease while the number
of workers who search will increase ￿as has been observed in recent years.32 The ambiguity arises
because of two countervailing e⁄ects. The pension-feasible region may get squeezed at the lower
end while expanding at the upper end, so the actual outcome depends primarily on the density of
the productivity distribution in di⁄erent regions. On the one hand, RP may increase, so pensions
in some of the less productive matches in which search used to be deterred are no longer feasible.
This will de￿nitely happen if it was already the case that RP > R, as in Figure 5, so pensions were
failing to deter some OTJ search. We already argued that this is likely to be the case. If there is
a great deal of density in the region over which RP rises, then even a small decrease in search costs
could cause a large decrease in the use of pension contracts and an associated increase in search.
On the other hand, the pension-feasible region gets expanded from above, as the search-deterring
threshold R rises. In the matches in which search is now attractive but was not before, GS(Y ) is
small relative to MP(Y ), so ￿rms will begin to o⁄er pensions. However, unless the productivity
distribution is skewed strongly to the right and therefore the mass of matches without search is
large (which seems unlikely, or else OTJ search and job-to-job ￿ ows would be very uncommon),
then the ￿rst e⁄ect (the squeeze from below) will dominate the second (the expansion from above),
and the number of pensions will decline.33
It should be noted that the e⁄ect of a decrease in the cost of search is robust to other speci￿ca-
tions of search costs. If search costs are borne entirely by the worker, then a decrease induces more
search because GS(Y ) rises and the incentive-compatibility constraint binds for more matches, with
no increased funding for pensions to counteract the e⁄ect. If search costs are borne entirely by
the ￿rm, then a decrease induces more search because MP(Y ) falls as search becomes less costly
for the ￿rm, so fewer pensions will be o⁄ered. The same e⁄ects occur whether search costs are a
32The economy will immediately enter a new steady state like this one if existing pensions contracts are renegotiated.
If not, then all existing pensions will be too small to deter search and will be abandoned, and the economy will reach
the new steady state after workers reshu› e into new jobs with new pensions.
33It is also likely that the average value of remaining pensions will change, depending on the density of Y and on
other parameters. At the lower end, the largest pensions will disappear but remaining pensions will get bigger; while
at the upper end, the new pensions that appear will be small. Evidence in FO suggests that remaining DB pensions
are becoming less valuable on average.
21function of productivity Y or are constant.
Thus, our model implies that the number of pensions is likely to fall when the costs of OTJ
search decline. Earlier, we discussed evidence of such a decline, so our results may help explain
the recent decline in job tenure and in DB pensions.
6 Conclusions
In the midst of the economic boom of the 1990s, the New York Times suggested that ￿the no-
tion of lifetime employment has come to seem as dated as soda jerks, or tail ￿ns￿(Kolbert and
Clymer [22]).34 While many media reports have highlighted the supposed decline in job stability,
economists have only recently found con￿rmation that job tenure has declined, while over a similar
period job-to-job ￿ ows have increased in frequency.
In this paper we propose a model of on-the-job search and job-to-job ￿ ows to help explain these
changes. Recent data makes it clear that these activities occur commonly, yet they are actively
discouraged by DB pensions. The decline in the use of DB pensions suggests an important link
with trends in tenure and job-to-job ￿ ows. Other recent theoretical papers have also tied together
the motive to search on-the-job with the use of tenure-based deferred compensation contracts. We
propose a model with some distinct features that add to our understanding of the costs and bene￿ts
of on-the-job search and, consequently, the feasibility of tenure-based contracts. Then, we highlight
changes in the expected value of search that can explain the declining use of such contracts. We
focus on a decline in search costs which, under fairly general conditions, would reduce the use of
DB pensions and boost worker mobility. A jump in the expected gains from search tallies with
observed growth in relative wages of job-to-job movers.
Further research on the causes and consequences of the recent decline in job tenure and the
connection to job-to-job ￿ ows will be important. Identifying the causes will ultimately allow a
careful evaluation of the welfare consequences for workers and ￿rms. Such an analysis might
reveal that DB pensions have become socially ine¢ cient, even if they remain privately e¢ cient.
In our model, pensions internalize the costs and bene￿ts of search within the match but impede
matches that o⁄er higher surplus to a new ￿rm from being formed. It is relevant that some of
34We have appropriated this quote, with thanks, from Neumark, Polsky, and Hansen [31].
22the federal pension regulations implemented since 1974 constrain the degree to which DB pensions
can be designed to condition compensation on tenure (Clark and McDermed [7]). This raises
the possibility that regulations were implemented in response to rising social gains from mobility
resulting from the types of changes we have outlined here. Our paper represents a step towards
understanding the causes and consequences of increased mobility.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
The worker￿ s current continuation value is
V w
s (Y ) = ￿ (Y ￿ c(Y )) + ￿ [￿Uw + (1 ￿ ￿)Jw
s (R(Y ))]
and the value of the new match is
V w
s (Y 0) = ￿
￿








The acceptance threshold is de￿ned as the minimum Y 0 that satis￿es V w
s (Y 0) > V w
s (Y ). By
construction, V w
s (Y ) is monotonically increasing in Y , which yields the result.35￿
Proof of Lemma 2:
Indi⁄erence at R implies V w
ns(R) = V w














+ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)Jw
s (R): (8)
Since V w
ns(R) = V w
























However, from (1), it can be shown that
V w
ns(Y ) =
￿ (Y ) + ￿￿Uw
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
: (10)
35Monotonicity also implies that the worker accepts Y
0 > R > Y:
23Substituting (10) into (9) yields the result.￿
Proof of Proposition 3:
Consider ￿(Y ￿c(Y ))+c(Y )￿￿(Y ). By de￿nition, ￿(Y )￿￿(Y ￿c(Y )) < Y ￿(Y ￿c(Y )) = c(Y ).




s (Y ) ￿ 0. It is straightforward
to show that
Jf
s (Y ) = V f
s (Y ) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ F(R(Y ))
￿
V f
s (Y ) ￿ Uf
￿
:
For R > Y > R, V
f
s (Y ) ￿ Uf > 0 by Nash bargaining36, and, thus, V
f
s (Y ) > J
f
s (Y ). De￿ne
b V f
s (Y ) = Y ￿ ￿(Y ￿ c(Y )) ￿ c(Y ) + ￿￿Uf + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)b V f




s (Y ) > V
f
s (Y ) > J
f
s (Y ). Moreover,
V f
ns(Y ) =
Y ￿ ￿(Y ) + ￿￿Uf
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
>
Y ￿ ￿(Y ￿ c(Y )) ￿ c(Y ) + ￿￿Uf
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
= b V f
s (Y )
since ￿(Y ) < ￿(Y ￿ c(Y )) + c(Y ). Thus, V
f
ns(Y ) > b V
f
s (Y ) > J
f
s (Y ). The result follows.￿
Proof of Proposition 4:




s (Y )] > ￿(1￿￿)[Jw
s (Y ) ￿ V w
ns(Y )].
From Proposition 3, V
f
ns(Y ) ￿ J
f
s (Y ) > 0, which implies that ￿(1 ￿ ￿)[V
f
ns(Y ) ￿ J
f
s (Y )] > 0 for
all Y . From Lemma 2, at Y = R, V w
ns(R) = V w








s (R) ￿ V w
ns(R)
￿





c(R) > ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
Jw




Finally, since Y < R implies V w
ns(Y ) < V w
s (Y ), continuity and the de￿nition of P give the result.￿
Proof of Proposition 5:
Consider c0(Y ) and c1(Y ), where c1(Y ) < c0(Y ) for all Y ￿ 0.
(i) R1 > R0: Recall that Ri solves GSi(Ri) = 0. Since GS0
i(Y ) is negative at Y = Ri, if
GS0(Y ) < GS1(Y ), the result follows.
(ii) GS1(Y ) > GS0(Y ) follows directly from (i).
36It is also true for Y ￿ R; V
f
ns(Y ) ￿ U
f > 0.
24(iii) MP1(Y ) < MP0(Y ) : By de￿nition, ￿(Y ￿c1(Y ))￿￿(Y ￿c0(Y ))￿c0(Y )+c1(Y ) < 0.
Thus, if V
f
ns;1(Y ) ￿ V
f
ns;0(Y ) < J
f
s;1(Y ) ￿ J
f
s;0(Y ), the result obtains. From (4), we have
J
f
s;1(Y ) ￿ J
f
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(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ F(Y ))[￿c1(Y ) + c0(Y ) ￿ ￿(Y ￿ c1(Y )) + ￿(Y ￿ c0(Y ))]
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿F(Y ))
+
￿
(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ F(Y ))
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿F(Y ))
￿
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(1) We used the method described in Stewart (2002, 2005) to identify people in March CPSs from 1983-
2001 who had moved job-to-job (with an intervening unemployment spell of 0-2 weeks) within the 
previous 14.5 months, versus those who had stayed in the same job continuously.  We used the sample 
selection criteria from Stewart (workers aged 19-55, with at least one year of potential labor market 
experience, who are not currently and were not self-employed in the previous year, and who worked full-
time in the previous year) but limited the sample to people in the outgoing rotation groups, for whom the 
CPS collected data on current hourly earnings.  Our resulting sample ranges from 7,000-9,000 per year. 
 
(2) We ran a regression on each year’s sample, putting log hourly earnings on the left-hand side and putting 
an indicator variable on the right-hand side for people experiencing a job-to-job flow, along with controls 
for gender, education (did not finish high school, high school diploma, attended but did not finish college, 
finished a college degree), age (and its square), and race (white, black, other).  We computed Huber-White 
standard errors and used earnings weights. 
 
(3) Figure 2 reports the coefficient estimates on the indicator variable for people experiencing a job-to-job 
flow from these regressions.  Thus, it shows the percentage difference in wages each year for job-to-job 
movers compared to job stayers, controlling for demographics. FIGURE 3
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NOTES (continued from Figure 2) 
 
(4)  We took the coefficient estimates reported in Figure 2, which show the percentage difference in wages 
each year for job-to-job movers compared to job stayers, and regressed them on the contemporaneous 
unemployment rate in order to remove business cycle effects.  The residuals are shown as the heavy lower 
line in Figure 3.  Thus, it shows the percentage difference in wages for job-to-job movers compared to job 
stayers, controlling for demographics and for business cycle effects. 
 
(5)  Next, we adapted Stewart’s method to identify people in March CPSs who had moved to a new job 
within the previous 14.5 months and had experienced a spell of unemployment lasting more than 2 weeks 
(which may have occurred at any time during the previous 14.5 months).  We ran a similar regression as in 
(2) above, putting log hourly earnings on the left-hand side and now putting two indicator variables on the 
right-hand side – one for people experiencing a job-to-job flow and one for people experiencing an 
unemployment-to-job flow – along with the same controls for gender, education, age, and race. 
 
(6)  The regressions yielded two coefficient estimates of interest, the percentage difference in wages for 
job-to-movers compared to job stayers and for unemployment-to-job movers compared to job stayers.  As 
in (4) above, we regressed the coefficient estimates on the contemporaneous unemployment rate in order to 
remove business cycle effects.  The difference between these residuals is shown as the light upper line in 
Figure 3.  Thus, it shows the percentage difference in wages for unemployment-to-job movers compared to 
job-to-job movers, controlling for demographics and for business cycle effects.   FIGURE 4: Initial Steady State  
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FIGURE 5: New Steady State after Decline in Search Costs 
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